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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction in accordance with an order of this Court dated
February 14, 2008, granting certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) (2002) renumbered as Utah Code § 78A-3102(5) by 2008 Utah Laws Ch. 3 (H.B. 78 (effective February 7, 2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
This Court granted certiorari in this case to review the following two limited
issues:
1.

Whether the court of appeals correctly construed and applied relevant

provisions of the Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act in holding that the district
court could extend the period for rejecting Petitioner's claim
2.

Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the district court's award of

attorney fees and in imposing fees for the appeal.
This Court did not agree to review the ruling of the court of appeals that the
Petitioner's claim was barred as a matter of law by both the Utah statute of frauds and
Utah's broker licensing statutes. Thus, the decision of the court of appeals on these
issues constitutes a final judicial determination.
Standard of Review
"On certiorari review, this court reviews the decision of the court of appeals, not
the decision of the district court." Ellsworth Paulsen Const Co. v. 51-SPR-L.L.C, 2008
UT 28, — P.3d —, 2008 WL 926586, t l 12-13. Where, as here, the court of appeals
reviewed the district court's grant of a motion for summary judgment, the supreme court
1

accords no particular deference to the ruling of the court of appeals but reviews it for
correctness. Id. However, this Court may affirm the result reached by the court of
appeals on any ground. Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, f 10, 52 P.3d 1158 (an appellate
court may affirm a judgment on "any legal ground or theory apparent on the record").
As to the award of attorney fees, "[w]hether the trial court properly interpreted the
legal prerequisites for awarding attorney fees under section 78-27-56 is a question of law
that [this court] review[s] . . . for correctness. The question of whether, under the second
prerequisite of section 78-27-56, a claim was brought in bad faith is a question of fact
[that] [this Court] reviews . . . under a clearly erroneous standard." Still Standing Stable,
LLC v. Allen, 2005 UT 46, 122 P.3d 556, K 8.
STATUTES
Resolution of the issues on which the Court granted certiorari requires
consideration of the following statutes and rule.
I.

Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1305(1) provides:
A dissolved company in winding up may dispose of the known claims against it by
following the procedures described in this section.

II.

Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1212 provides:
(1) A court in a judicial proceeding brought to dissolve a company may, at any
time before entering a decree of dissolution, appoint one or more custodians to
manage the business and affairs of the company until further order of the court and
may, upon or after entering a decree dissolving the company, appoint one or more
receivers to wind up and liquidate the business and affairs of the company. The
court shall hold a hearing, after giving notice to all parties to the proceeding and
any interested persons designated by the court, before appointing a receiver or a
custodian. The court appointing a receiver or custodian has exclusive jurisdiction
over the company and all of its property wherever located.
(2) The court may appoint any person or the court may require the receiver or
2

custodian to post bond, with or without sureties, in an amount the court directs.
(3) The court shall describe the powers and duties of the receiver or custodian in
its appointing order, which may be amended from time to time. Among other
powers:
(a) the receiver:
(i) may dispose of all or any part of the assets of the company wherever
located, at a public or private sale, if authorized by the court; and
(ii) may sue and defend in its own name as receiver of the company in all
courts of this state; or
(b) the custodian may exercise all of the powers of the company, through or in
place of its members or managers, to the extent necessary to manage the affairs of
the company in the best interests of its members and creditors.
(4) The court during a receivership may redesignate the receiver a custodian, and
during a custodianship may redesignate the custodian a receiver, if doing so is in
the best interests of the company, its members, and its creditors.
(5) The court from time to time during the receivership or custodianship may order
compensation paid and expense disbursements or reimbursements made to the
receiver or custodian and the custodian's or receiver's counsel from the assets of
the company or proceeds from the sale of the assets.
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4 provides in pertinent part:
The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or some note or
memorandum of the agreement, is in writing, signed by the party to be charged
with the agreement:
(5) every agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker to purchase or
sell real estate for compensation.
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-18(2) states:
No sales agent or associate broker may sue in his own name for the recovery of a
fee, commission, or compensation for services as a sales agent or associate broker
unless the action is against the principal broker with whom he is or was licensed.
Any action for the recovery of a fee, commission, or other compensation may only
be instituted and brought by the principal broker with whom the sales agent or
associate broker is affiliated.
3

V.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 provides:
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing
party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without
merit and not brought or asserted in good faith.

VI.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(g) provides in relevant part:
If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or
solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party presenting
them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the
filing of the affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case arises from the judicial dissolution proceeding of Olympus Construction,

L.C. ("Olympus"). The appellee and respondent in this case is Annette W. Jarvis, the
court-appointed receiver of Olympus (the "Receiver")- The appellant and petitioner is
David C. Matthews ("Matthews"). Matthews is a real estate agent, now inactive, who
claims that he is entitled to a real estate commission from Olympus on the basis of an
alleged oral agreement. It is undisputed this claim is barred by both the statute of frauds
and by Utah's broker licensing statutes, and since certiorari was not granted on these
issues, there has been a final judicial determination. In addition, all four judges who have
reviewed this matter to date have concluded that Matthews's claim was without merit.
Furthermore, Matthews filed a false claim under penalty of perjury and supported his
meritless claim with false affidavits. He also filed perjurious discovery responses. After
the Receiver established the falsity of the affidavits, Matthews changed his story and filed

4

additional false affidavits. Matthews's own false affidavit in this case has never been
corrected.
Because his Claim was barred by law, Matthews seized on a perceived technicality
in the Limited Liability Company Act to argue that his false claim had to be "considered
approved." However, as explained below, the statutory provision upon which Matthews
relies is permissive, and it was not adopted by the district court.
Course of Proceedings
In 2002, a petition for the dissolution of Olympus was filed with the Third Judicial
District Court. R. 1. The district court appointed a receiver to wind up the affairs of
Olympus. R. 586, 589. The Receiver subsequently obtained from the court orders
establishing (1) a claims bar date, (2) a claims filing procedure, and then, after claims had
been filed, initially reviewed, and settlement possibilities explored, (3) a claims
resolution procedure. R. 843, 2085.
In 2004, Matthews filed his claim form with the district court pursuant to the
claims bar date and claims filing procedure (the "Claim" or the "Matthews Claim").
Matthews alleged—based upon an alleged 1998 oral contract—that he was personally
entitled to a real estate commission from Olympus in the amount of $100,000.* R. 968.
In response to the Receiver's motion for an order establishing a claims resolution
procedure to resolve all claims filed in the receivership, R. 1021., Matthews filed a motion
with the district court arguing that because the Receiver had not rejected his meritless
1

It is undisputed that (1) a lesser amount was listed in the written real estate documents
attached to Matthews's claim form as his supporting documentation, and (2) that the
amount listed in the written documents was in fact paid to Matthews's broker.
5

Claim within ninety days of its filing, his Claim had to be "considered approved" and had
to be paid in full regardless of whether or not the Claim was proper. R. 1044.
Disposition Below
The district court denied Matthews's motion to pay his claim and held that
Matthews's Claim should be adjudicated in accordance with the claims resolution
procedure proposed by the Receiver and subsequently adopted by the court. R. 2145. In
accordance with procedures adopted by the court, the Receiver objected to Matthews5s
Claim. R. 2147. The Receiver then filed a motion seeking summary judgment to
disallow the Matthews Claim because it is barred by (1) the statute of frauds and (2) Utah
real estate statutes. R. 2647. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
the Receiver. R. 3037. The Receiver also sought an award of attorney fees from
Matthews, R. 2986, and the district court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law
with respect to the attorney fee issue. R. 3122. Then, the district court entered its order
granting attorney fees to the Receiver. R. 3155. Matthews appealed, R. 3320, and the
court of appeals affirmed the decision of the district court on both the merits and on the
issue of attorney fees. 2007 UT App 361, 173 P.3d 192. Matthews then filed a petition
for a writ of certiorari with this Court, and this Court agreed to review two narrow
aspects of the ruling of the court of appeals.
Statement of Facts
The Dissolution of Olympus
1.

On or about January 31, 2002, a Petition for Judicial Dissolution of

Olympus was filed with the district court. R. 1.
6

2.

On August 20, 2002, the court entered an Order of Decree of Judicial

Dissolution and Conversion of Custodian into Receiver (the "Order of Dissolution"). R.
589. Pursuant to the Order of Dissolution, the district court appointed a receiver and
granted the receiver "the normal and customary powers of a receiver." IdL On May 5,
2003, the court entered its Stipulated Order Approving Successor Receiver ("Successor
Receiver Order"), appointing Annette W. Jarvis as the Successor Receiver.
3.

The Successor Receiver Order provides, in relevant part:

2.
. . . As Receiver, Ms. Jarvis shall wind up the business and affairs of
Olympus as provided in Part 13 of the Utah Limited Liability Company Act, and
shall exercise all of the powers of a receiver of a limited liability company
provided for by law or equity, except as her powers may be specifically
circumscribed or expanded by the terms of this Order or any subsequent order of
the Court
4.
Except as otherwise provided herein the Receiver may dispose of
known and unknown claims against Olympus by notice and/or publication, may
set dates for the barring of such claims and may accept or reject claims all as
provided in Utah Code Ann. Sections 48-2c-1305 and 1306. To the extent
permitted by law, all claims filed against Olympus shall be adjudicated and
determined by this Court in and as part of this proceeding. The Receiver may
petition the Court, and the Court may order, expedited procedures for the
adjudication and determination of claims, as may be appropriate and necessary
for the prompt determination of claims.
12. Nothing in this Order shall prevent the Receiver from requesting
augmentation, modification, or supplementation of her powers as Receiver to the
full extent permitted by law or equity upon further application to the Court and
after notice and a hearing.
Id. at Iff 2, 4, 12 (emphasis added).
The Establishment of Procedures by the District Court
4.

Pursuant to her authority under the Successor Receiver Order, the Receiver

filed a motion with the district court seeking to establish a claims bar date and a claims
7

filing procedure, with a memorandum in support thereof. R. 791-835. Copies of the
motion and memorandum were served on Matthews. Id.
5.

The supporting memorandum clearly stated that the Receiver would later

file a motion to establish a claims adjudication process. R. 797 at \ 12.
6.

Despite having received a notice of the motion and accompanying

memorandum, neither Matthews nor any other party filed an objection to the motion for a
bar date and claims filing procedure, and on February 26, 2004, the court entered its
Order Granting Receiver's Motion for Declaratory Relief and Establishing a Claim Bar
Date and a Claim Filing Procedure (the "Bar Date Order"). R. 843.
7.

The Bar Date Order established June 30, 2004, as "the bar date for all

claims to be filed against Olympus5 receivership estate," and further provided that "to the
extent creditor claims are not timely filed, they will be forever barred." Id. at Tf 3. The
Bar Date Order also approved the form and manner of written notice to be provided to
known creditors, the form and manner of publication notice to be provided to all
creditors, and the procedures by which creditors were to file their notices of claim against
the Receivership Estate. R. 864 at Tf 36. The Bar Date Order did not address how claims
filed pursuant to the Bar Date Order were to be resolved, see id, nor did the Bar Date
Order include any provision for the automatic allowance of claims. Indeed, the Bar Date
Order did not even reference section 1305. Rather, the order states: "[T]he filing of a
claim by a creditor against Olympus does not necessarily mean that it will be allowed.
The Receiver . . . reserves the right to file an objection to all or a portion of any filed
claim. Id. at f 4(D).
8

8.

On June 30, 2004, Matthews filed his Claim, asserting that he had a claim

in his own name for services he rendered to Olympus in connection with the acquisition
of real estate on or about December 3, 1998. R. 968.
9.

Thereafter, and in accordance with the statement made in her motion for a

claims bar date and a claims filing procedure, the Receiver filed a motion on November
18, 2004, for approval of claims resolution procedures. R. 1021-1038.
10.

Matthews responded to the Receiver's motion for the establishment of

claim resolution procedures by filing his motion for an order requiring payment of his
claim in which he argued that his claim was "considered approved" pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 48-2c-1305(4). R. 1044. Matthews also formally and simultaneously
opposed the approval of the claims resolution procedures. R. 1047.
11.

On March 16, 2005, the district court entered an order establishing a claims

resolution procedure (the "Claims Resolution Order"). R. 2085.
12.

On March 29, 2005, the district court denied Matthews's motion for an

order requiring the Receiver to pay his claim. R. 2145. The district court specifically
indicated that Matthews's claim would be resolved "in accordance with the Claim
Resolution Procedure approved by the Court." Id. Thus, the district court ruled that the
provisions of section 48-2c-1305 were permissive, and that the Receiver was entitled to
have all of the claims against Olympus—including the Matthews Claim—adjudicated on
the merits. In reaching its decision on this point, the district court was interpreting its
own earlier order, and the district court found that its order establishing a bar date was
not an order adopting the procedures of section 1305.
9

Adjudication of the Matthews Claim
13.

On July 6, 2005, the Receiver filed a motion for summary judgment, asking

the district court to disallow Matthews's claim on the grounds that it was barred by the
statute of frauds and by Utah's real estate statutes.2 R. 2647.
14.

The trial court granted summary judgment on December 20,2005. R.

3037.
The Basis for an Award of Attorney Fees
15.

On June 125 2006, the district court entered its findings of fact and

conclusions of law with respect to the Receiver's motion for attorney fees. R. 3122. The
district court made the following factual findings:
A.

Matthews signed the Matthews Claim on June 7, 2004, and filed the

claim in this Receivership case on June 30, 2004.

The two summary judgment grounds asserted by the Receiver are not the only bases on
which relief may be granted disallowing the Matthews Claim. For example, the
Matthews Claim, R. 968, does not set forth that his right to entitlement is by virtue of
assignment, R. 2883-2884 ^[ 11-12, which would make it facially defective, or that as of
the date of dissolution Matthews's right was contingent on a sale of the property by the
Receiver, and thus not matured R. 2883-28841 8. Although Matthews relies on
subsection 48-2c-l305(4) to support his "considered approved" argument, he ignores his
own argument that his right to the alleged commission matured after the effective date of
dissolution which is not within the definition of a "claim" under subsection 48-2c1305(6), but is within the broader definition of claim set forth in the Bar Date Order and
Notice of Claim form. In other words, Matthews cannot have it both ways. If all of the
provisions of section 1305 must be applied literally notwithstanding the alternative, more
tailored procedures adopted by the district court in this case, Matthews does not have a
claim under the statute that can either be allowed or disallowed.
10

B.

Pursuant to the Matthews Claim, Matthews asserted that Olympus

owes him $100,000 for his services as a real estate agent in connection with
Olympus's purchase of real property in Summit County in 1998.
C.

The face of the "Notice of Claim" form on which Matthews asserted

his claim indicates that by signing and filing the claim, Matthews was swearing
and attesting "to the truthfulness and accuracy" of the claim under penalty of
perjury.
D.

The "Notice of Claim" form clearly identifies "David C. Matthews"

as the "Creditor," which the form defines as the "person or other entity to whom
Olympus owes money or property."
E.

Nothing on the face of the Matthews Claim or in any of the

documents Matthews submitted to the Receiver as attachments to the claim
indicates that the alleged $100,000 real estate commission was promised or owed
to any person or entity other than Matthews in his direct, individual capacity.
F.

After investigating the grounds for the Matthews Claim, the

Receiver determined that the claim was meritless.
G.

The Receiver sent a letter dated October 6, 2004 to Matthews'

counsel requesting that Matthews withdraw his claim and specifically notifying
Matthews that if he did not, the Receiver intended to "proceed with litigation in
the Receivership Court to obtain summary disallowance of the Matthews Claim"
and would seek "court costs and attorneys fees from Mr. Matthews to the extent
allowed by law."
11

H.

The Receiver incurred substantial attorney fees on behalf of

Olympus in various reasonable efforts to oppose the Matthews Claim, including
(but not limited to) attempting to convince Matthews to withdraw the claim
without litigation, successfully opposing Matthews5 motion to compel immediate
payment of the claim, formally opposing the claim pursuant to the court-approved
claim resolution procedures in effect in this Receivership, and successfully
prosecuting a summary judgment motion and obtaining a ruling disallowing the
claim as a matter of law.
I.

On May 12, 2005, Matthews filed his Amended Claim Response

(the "Claim Response") addressing the Receiver's formal objection to the
Matthews Claim.
J.

Nothing in the Claim Response indicated that the Matthews Claim

was based on an assignment of a claim held by a real estate broker named Fred B.
Law.
K.

Matthews contended that the documents submitted to the Receiver in

connection with the Matthews Claim "clearly establish the existence of a broker
relationship between Mr. Matthews and Olympus." Claim Response at 2-3.
L.

Matthews asserted that Olympus "agreed to pay Mr. Matthews a

$100,000 commission" (Claim Response at 3), that the claimed $100,000
commission "represents compensation for services provided by Mr. Matthews"
(Claim Response at 3), that Matthews "performed valuable services in conjunction
with the acquisition of the subject real property in reliance upon the agreement to
12

pay Mr. Matthews $100,000 in exchange for such services" (Claim Response at
7), that "the agreement to pay Mr. Matthews $100,000 was made . . . as an
inducement for Mr. Matthews to provide services" (Claim Response at 8), and that
"Mr. Matthews did not have a cognizable action against Olympus until Olympus
breached its promise to pay Mr. Matthews the $100,000" (Claim Response at 9).
M.

Matthews attempted to avoid the preclusive effect of the Utah statute

of frauds by arguing, contrary to governing case law and without any supporting
citations to the contrary, that the commission amount was not an essential contract
term and need not be in writing.
N.

Matthews argued that the statute of frauds did not apply because of a

limited exception under Utah case law that only applies when a defendant has
admitted, either in pleadings or under oath, that an oral contract exists.
O.

Matthews knew that neither Olympus nor the Receiver ever admitted

the existence of the alleged oral contract in any pleading or in any sworn
statement.
P.

Matthews had more than six years after the alleged oral promise was

made in late 1998 to obtain a sworn statement from an authorized representative of
Olympus as evidence of the alleged promise, but he failed to do so.
Q.

Matthews admitted that his attempt to obtain a signed writing from

Richard Jaffa to evidence the alleged oral promise was unsuccessful.
R.

After the Receiver raised the effect of the Utah broker commission

statutes, Matthews attempted to avoid the preclusive effect of the statutes by
13

arguing, contrary to his original position, that he was an assignee of a claim
belonging to a principal broker and that he could pursue the assignor's claim in his
own name.
S.

In Request No. 14 of the Receiver's Requests for Admission

pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 36, Matthews admitted the following: "Admit that
your filing of the Matthews Claim and related papers in the receivership court is
an attempt by you to obtain payment of the real estate commission from someone
other than a principal broker."
T.

In Request No. 16, Matthews admitted the following: "Admit that

Re-Max Brokers, L.C. was the principal brokerage with which you were affiliated
during the period August 1998 through December 1998."
U.

In Interrogatory No. 4 of the Receiver's Interrogatories propounded

to Matthews pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 33, Matthews identified all principal
brokers with whom he was affiliated, and Matthews stated, in relevant part: "Jane
Matthews principal broker in 1998." Matthews made no mention of Fred B. Law
as his principal broker.
V.

In Interrogatory No. 6, Matthews identified "all persons who may

have information concerning the Matthews Claim," including the names of twelve
specific individuals, but did not list Fred B. Law.
W.

In response to the Receiver's Requests for Production of Documents

made to Matthews pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 34, the only document Matthews
produced was a copy of a one-page "Certificate of Licensure" issued by the Utah
14

Division of Real Estate concerning the real estate license of David C. Matthews,
which Certificate clearly indicates that Matthews was licensed as an Associate
Broker of "Re-Max Brokers" from February 1998 to March 1999, and did not
become affiliated with "Re-Max Town & Country" until February 2001.
X.

The Certificate is consistent with Matthews' response to Request for

Admission No. 16 noted above, but is inconsistent with the false statements in his
affidavit discussed below.
Y.

In his response to Request for Admission No. 6, Matthews admitted

that at all relevant times he was "bound by the Utah statutes and administrative
rules applicable to licensed real estate associate brokers."
Z.

In response to Request No. 10, Matthews admitted that he

"personally asked Richard Jaffa to provide [to Matthews] a signed document
indicating that Olympus had agreed to pay [Matthews] a $100,000 real estate
commission in connection with Olympus's purchase of the Property in December
1998, but he [Jaffa] refused to do so."
AA.

In the Receiver's initial memorandum filed July 6, 2005 in support

of her summary judgment motion, the Receiver argued that the Matthews Claim
was barred as a matter of law by the Utah statute of frauds and also by Utah real
estate commission statutes.
BB.

In Matthew's Notice of Claim, which he signed under penalty of

perjury on June 7, 2004, in Matthew's Claim Response filed May 12, 2005, and in
Matthew's sworn and binding answers to the Receiver's written discovery
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requests, Matthews stated unequivocally that the alleged oral promise to pay a
$100,000 commission was made by Olympus directly to him and gave rise to a
payment obligation Olympus owed directly to him.
CC.

On August 12, 2005, when Matthews filed his memorandum in

opposition to summary judgment and related affidavits (after the Receiver pointed
out that under Utah law only a principal broker could pursue a commission claim
against Olympus), Matthews stated under oath that the alleged oral promise
actually was made not to him but to "Re/Max Town and Country," and that his
wife, as the principal broker of "Re/Max Town and Country," had assigned the
claim to him.
DD.

On October 20, 2005, when Matthews filed his "Supplemental

Memorandum" and related affidavits (after the Receiver pointed out the false
statements in the two prior affidavits), Matthews changed his story again by
asserting that it was not actually his wife who was the principal broker entitled to
assert the claim against Olympus, but Fred B. Law, who had orally assigned the
claim to Matthews' wife, who later orally assigned the claim to Matthews.
EE.

On August 12, 2005, Matthews filed his Memorandum in

Opposition to the Receiver's motion for summary judgment, and in support
thereof, he also filed the Affidavit of David C. Matthews (the "David Matthews
Affidavit") and the Affidavit of Jane Astle Matthews (the "Jane Matthews
Affidavit").
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FF.

The David Matthews Affidavit contains false statements that directly

contradict Matthews' prior representations and statements made under penalty of
perjury including in paragraph 4 of the affidavit wherein Matthews states that in
1998, he and his wife owed a real estate brokerage company in Park City named
"Re/Max Town and Country," and that his wife was the principal broker.
GG.

The Certificate of Licensure in Matthews' own possession that he

produced in response to the Receiver's document request clearly shows that
Matthews did not become affiliated with Re-Max Town & Country until February
2001, more than two years after the December 1998 transaction.
HH.

The statement in paragraph 4 of the Matthews Affidavit directly

contradicts Matthews' answer to Request for Admission No. 16.
II.

In paragraphs 8 and 9 of the David Matthews Affidavit, Matthews

states, that the alleged promise by Olympus to pay a $100,000 commission was
made directly "to Re/Max" rather than to Matthews personally.
JJ.

Paragraph 12 of the David Matthews Affidavit states that Matthews'

pursuit of the $100,000 commission "has been in my capacity as the assignee from
my wife of the Commission," which statement directly contradicts the statements
Matthews made under penalty of perjury on the face of the Matthews Claim and
his other statements and representations alleging that the $100,000 commission
was promised to him personally and earned by him personally, and that he was
pursuing the claim in his own right and in his own name as the "Creditor" to
whom Olympus owed the money.
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KK.

The Jane Matthews Affidavit contains similar false statements

concerning Jane Matthews5 alleged status as the principal broker of Re/Max Town
and Country in 1998.
LL.

The false statements in the David Matthews Affidavit and the Jane

Matthews Affidavit caused the Receiver to incur additional legal fees, including
but not limited to those incurred in investigating the new allegations, obtaining a
Certificate of Licensure concerning Jane Matthews, and pointing out those false
statements to this Court in the Receiver's reply memorandum in support of
summary judgment.
MM. Nearly two months after the Receiver's reply memorandum was
served, and only three business days before the summary judgment hearing,
Matthews served a second "Affidavit of Jane Astle Matthews" admitting that her
prior affidavit contained false statements, admitting that "Re-Max Brokers, L.C."
(not Re/Max Town and Country) was the brokerage with which she and Matthews
were associated in 1998, and admitting that she was not a principal broker at the
relevant time.
NN.

Although the new affidavit of Jane Matthews contradicted and

purportedly corrected some of her prior sworn statements regarding these facts, no
new affidavit for David Matthews was submitted to withdraw or amend his own
false affidavit on these same points.
00.

The only affidavit of David Matthews on file with this Court

contains materially false statements that Matthews knows are false.
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PP.

In addition to purporting to correct prior false statements in her

affidavit, the new affidavit of Jane Matthews stated that an individual named Fred
B. Law was the principal broker with which both she and Matthews were affiliated
in 1998, and that Mr. Law had assigned the $100,000 commission claim to Jane
Matthews, who in turn assigned the claim to Matthews.
QQ.

Matthews filed the new affidavit of Jane Matthews on October 20,

2005 along with his "Supplemental Memorandum."
RR.

In the "Supplemental Memorandum," Matthews adopted his new

"Fred Law assignment" theory as the basis for his claim, and he also included an
affidavit of Fred B. Law.
SS.

In late October 2005, less than 3 business days before the summary

judgment hearing and more than 16 months after Matthews signed the Matthews
Claim under penalty of perjury, Matthews asserted for the first time that the
$100,000 claim he was pursuing against Olympus was actually a claim of Remax
Brokers, L.C., with Fred B. Law as principal broker that Matthews held only by
way of an indirect, double oral assignment.
TT.

The Receiver incurred additional fees responding to the untimely

and unauthorized Supplemental Memorandum and related supplemental affidavits.
UU.

At the conclusion of the summary judgment hearing held October

24, 2005, this Court disallowed the Matthews Claim and ailed that the claim was
barred as a matter of law by the Utah statute of frauds and applicable provisions of
Utah real estate commission statutes.
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W.

The actions taken by Matthews in support of the Matthews Claim

were solely for the purpose of causing delay and needlessly increasing the cost of
this litigation.
WW. Matthews' improper actions in pursuing the Matthews' Claim were
motivated by his financial desire of $100,000, as sought by the Matthews' Claim.
R.3122.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
It had been conclusively established that Matthews's Claim in this case is without
merit and barred by Utah law. Nevertheless, Matthews argues, based upon a perceived
technicality in a permissive statutory procedure that was not adopted by the district court,
that the Receiver must pay his meritless and false claim. However, the court of appeals
correctly ruled that the district court was entitled to consider the substantive merits of the
Matthews Claim. The district court correctly ruled that section 48-2c-1305 is permissive
in nature and was not applicable to the claims resolution procedure that the district court
had established in this case. In other words, the district court properly interpreted its own
bar date order as not having implemented a claims resolution procedure under section
1305 but as having decided that the district court would establish a claims resolution
procedure at a later date. Therefore, the court of appeals did not err in affirming the
judgment of the district court. The court of appeals also affirmed the mling of the district
court on the alternative basis that in a judicial receivership case a court of equity may
extend deadlines for objections to claims.
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In addition, the district court awarded attorney fees because Matthews's claim for
an alleged oral real estate commission that was allegedly twice orally assigned was both
without merit and in bad faith. Matthews filed a claim that he knew or should have
known was without merit, asserting under penalty of perjury that the claim was his own
claim (rather than someone else's claim that had been assigned to him). Then, after the
Receiver moved for summary judgment, Matthews filed false affidavits of both himself
and his spouse in an effort to avoid the effect of the real estate commission statute and the
statute of frauds. These affidavits contradicted Matthews's own prior sworn Claim and
his sworn discovery responses.
Further, because Matthews asserted positions contrary to established Utah law, the
district court correctly ruled, and the court of appeals correctly affirmed, that Matthews's
claim for an oral modification of a contract for a real estate commission in the amount of
$100,000 was barred by the statute of frauds. In addition, the district court correctly
found, and the court of appeals correctly affirmed, that Matthews was barred from
pursuing the claim for a real estate commission because he was not the real estate broker
for the real estate transaction and that two alleged oral assignments were irrelevant under
that statute. Fees for a claim without merit and filed in bad faith were appropriate. Fees
were also appropriate under Rule 56(g) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The court
of appeals did not err in affirming the district court's award of attorney fees to the
Receiver and in imposing fees for the appeal.
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ARGUMENT
This case involves numerous issues, only two of which are before this Court for
review.3 The first issue on which this Court granted Matthews's petition for a writ of
certiorari centers on the holding of the court of appeals that a district court has the power
to extend deadlines in cases before it. Although this was not the basis for the decision of
the district court, the court of appeals was free to affirm the decision of the district court
on any basis. Whether this Court decides to affirm the decision of the court of appeals on
the particular reasoning of that court or on the reasoning of the district court, this Court
should rule that the court of appeals was correct to affirm the decision of the district court
in this case. As explained below, the LLC Act is permissive in nature, and the provisions
of the LLC Act upon which Matthews relies did not control the disposition of Matthews's
claim.
The second issue that this Court agreed to review was whether the court of appeals
erred in affirming the district court's award of attorney fees and in awarding the Receiver
her attorney fees on appeal. As to this issue, there is a final determination in this case
that Matthews 's Claim should never have been filed in the first place because it is barred
by the statute of frauds and by Utah's real estate statutes and because the claim, which
was filed under penalty of perjury, contained false information. In addition, Matthews
submitted successive false affidavits and provided false statements under oath in this case
in order to promote a constantly changing story in an attempt to get his meritless and

This Court did not agree to review the opinion of the court of appeals that Matthews's
claim was barred by the statute of frauds and by Utah's real estate statutes.
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falsely filed claim allowed. The district court therefore did not err in awarding attorney
fees in this case.
Each of the two issues just described is analyzed more fully below. However,
proper analysis of these issues requires an understanding of why Matthews's Claim was
without merit and the reasons why it constituted bad faith for Matthews to file and pursue
his Claim, including that the Matthews's allegations involving section 1305 would never
have been an issue but for the wrongfully filed claim. Accordingly, the Receiver will
first explain why Matthews's claim was without merit and filed in bad faith.
I.

MATTHEWS'S CLAIM WAS WITHOUT MERIT AND FILED IN BAD
FAITH.
Matthews's claim against Olympus was legally without merit and was filed and

pursued in bad faith, as factually found by the district court, for two important reasons.
First, the Claim was barred by the statute of frauds, and as a licensed real estate agent
Matthews knew or should have known this. Second, under Utah law a claim for real
estate commissions may be made only by a licensed real estate broker. Matthews knew
or should have known this fact. Further, when the law in this regard was pointed out to
him, Matthews should have withdrawn his Claim rather than doggedly pursuing it with
false testimony to support his ever-changing story.
A.

MATTHEWS'S CLAIM IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF
FRAUDS.

It has now been conclusively established in this case that Matthews's Claim is
barred by the statute of frauds. Even in his brief to this Court, Matthews admits that his
claim for a real estate commission of $100,000 is based on "an oral modification of the
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brokerage agreement whereby an agent of Olympus promised that Olympus would pay
Mr. Matthews and his principal broker an additional $100,000 commission." Brief of
Appellant ("Matthews's Brief) at 29 (emphasis added). As the court of appeals
explained in this case, '"a broker [or agent] must be presumed to know that an oral
contract of employment for rendition of services in negotiating a sale of real estate for a
commission is invalid."' 2007 UT App |13 (quoting Machan Hampshire Props,, Inc. v.
Western Real Estate & Dev. Co., 779 P.2d 230, 234 n.8 (Utah Ct. App. 1989 (bracketed
material added by court of appeals).
Because Matthews was "presumed to know" the law in this regard, he never
should have filed his Claim in the first place. Nonetheless, Matthews doggedly insisted
the statute of frauds did not apply because of a limited exception under Utah case law that
applies only in the narrow circumstance in which a defendant has admitted "in the
pleadings" or "at trial" that an oral contract exists. See Matthews's Brief at 29 (quoting
L.P. Bentley v. Potter, 694 P.2d 617, 621 (Utah 1984)). Matthews knew that neither
Olympus nor the Receiver ever admitted the existence of the alleged oral contract in any
pleading or at trial. Matthews had more than six years after the alleged oral promise was
made in late 1998 to obtain a sworn statement from an authorized representative of
Olympus as evidence of the alleged promise, but he failed to do so. Matthews admits
under penalty of perjury in his discovery responses that he attempted to obtain—and was
unsuccessful in obtaining—a signed writing from Richard Jaffa4 to evidence the alleged

The Receiver does not admit that Richard Jaffa was an authorized representative of
Olympus, but even if he was, Matthews never obtained any written evidence (sworn or
unsworn) from Richard Jaffa.
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oral promise. Unable to obtain any admissible evidence of the alleged oral agreement,
Matthews simply relied on his own self-serving testimony. As the court of appeals
correctly held in this case, the judicial-admission exception to the statute of frauds "does
not apply when the party making the claim simply asserts the admission" himself. 2007
UTAPP 361,112.
In short, Matthews never should have filed his Claim in the first place, nor should
he have pursued it for as long as he has.
B.

MATTHEWS'S CLAIM IS UNLAWFUL UNDER UTAH REAL
ESTATE STATUTES,

Not only is Matthews's Claim barred by the statute of frauds, it has been
conclusively established that the claim is unlawful under Utah real estate statutes that are
designed to protect a seller of property from being subjected to multiple claims for a real
estate commission. Utah law specifically prohibits a real estate sales agent or associate
broker from "suing in his own name" or commencing "any action" for the recovery of a
fee, commission, or compensation concerning the purchase or sale of real estate, as
follows:
No sales agent or associate broker may sue in his own name for the recovery of
a fee, commission, or compensation for services as a sales agent or associate
broker . . . . Any action for the recovery of a fee, commission, or other
compensation may only be instituted and brought by the principal broker with
whom the sales agent or associate broker is affiliated.
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-18(2) (emphasis added). It was undisputed in the district court
that Matthews was at all relevant times an "associate broker" (License No. 5452612AB00) and not a "principal broker." In filing his claim, Matthews was trying to recover a
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commission directly from a seller of real estate for his services as an associate broker.
Thus, his claim is illegal under Utah law.
After the Receiver moved for summary judgment on the ground that Matthews's
Claim was unlawful, Matthews changed his story to say that the alleged oral promise to
pay a $100,000 commission actually was made not to him but to "Re/Max Town and
Country," and that his spouse, as the principal broker of "Re/Max Town and Country,"
had orally assigned the claim to him. When the Receiver pointed out that Matthews did
not become affiliated with Re-Max Town & Country until February 2001, more than two
years after the December 1998 transaction, Matthews submitted a last-minute
"Supplemental Memorandum" and new affidavits in which changed his story yet again
by asserting that it was not actually his spouse who was the principal broker entitled to
assert the claim against Olympus, but Fred B. Law, who had orally assigned the claim to
Matthews's spouse, who later orally assigned the claim to Matthews.
The constant changes in Matthews's story illustrated that not only should the claim
never have been filed, but also that it was doggedly pursued in bad faith based on false
affidavits and false sworn statements. Nevertheless, Matthews argues that, based upon a
statutory provision not adopted by the district court, the Receiver must pay his unlawful
Claim in full. For the reasons set forth below, this Court should affirm the holding of the
court of appeals that the district court was entitled to reach the merits of Matthews's
claim.
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II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE DISTRICT
COURT WAS ENTITLED TO RESOLVE MATTHEWS'S CLAIM ON THE
MERITS.
As established above, Matthews has never had a legitimate claim against

Olympus. Not only is his claim barred by the statute of frauds and Utah's real estate
statutes, the claim was submitted in bad faith and supported by materially false
statements under oath. Under these circumstances, there is no "claim" to either allow or
object to, and the particular provisions of section 1305 upon which Matthews so heavily
relies simply do not apply. Stated another way, the law does not recognize Matthews's
Claim, and he cannot take advantage of a hypertechnical argument to obtain money that
he is admittedly not legally entitled to collect. However, as shown below, even if the
Court considers Matthews's arguments regarding section 1305, the Court should still
affirm the decision of the court of appeals because Matthews's arguments about section
1305 are incorrect, as the district court had authority either to establish deadlines other
than those set forth in the permissive section 1305, or, as the court of appeals decided, to
extend the deadlines found in section 1305.
A.

MATTHEWS DOES NOT HAVE A "CLAIM" UNDER SECTION
1305.

In his brief to this Court Matthews insists on application of section 1305 of the
LLC Act to the exclusion of the alternative claims adjudication procedures ordered by the
district court. The problem with Matthews's argument is that application of all of the
provisions of section 1305 establishes that Matthews does not even have a claim under
section 1305 in the first place. As explained below, if section 1305 is applied here, there
is nothing that can be "considered approved."
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As pointed out above, the district court did not (and was not required to) adopt
section 1305, including the provision in section 1305(4) that if "claims" are not
"rejected" within ninety days, they "shall be considered approved." Is is important to
note, however, that the district court also did not adopt section 1305's definition of what
constitutes a claim. The procedures established by the district court allowed for
contingent and unmatured claims (such as the Matthews Claim) to be filed with the
Court. However, if as Matthews suggests, the district court had no alternative but to
strictly apply (without picking and choosing) the provisions of section 1305, then the
district court would have been required to strictly apply the definition of "claim" in
section 1305 and would not have been permitted to define "claim" more broadly than in
the statute.
Under the language of section 1305, Matthews did not have a "claim" for two
important reasons. First, as pointed out above, Matthews's Claim is unlawful and barred
by law. An illegal demand for payment supported by later-filed false affidavits does not
rise to the level of a "claim" under section 1305. Otherwise, section 1305 would become
a free pass for fraudulent and illegal demands for payments from dissolved companies.
In addition, section 1305(6) states, "For purposes of this section, 'claim' does not
include a contingent liability or a claim based on an event occurring after the effective
date of dissolution." The purpose of this provision is to freeze the rights and liabilities of
a company as of the date that a court orders dissolution. Thus, under section 1305, in
order for Matthews to have a valid claim against Olympus, he must have had a right to
demand payment as of the date of dissolution of Olympus. Cf. McFarling v. Demco, Inc.,
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546 P.2d 625, 628 (Okla. 1976) (rights become fixed with appointment of receiver for
insolvent insurance company). In this case, Matthews's claim was admittedly contingent.
Even if his allegation is correct that he was promised $100,000 if and when the property
was sold, the property was not sold as of the effective date of dissolution in this case but
only later as part of the dissolution itself.5 Therefore, Matthews's Claim was both
"contingent" and "based on an event occurring after the effective date of dissolution." It
is therefore not a "claim" under section 1305, and the provisions of section 1305 about
certain "claims" being "considered approved" are simply inapplicable in this case.
Matthews accuses the Receiver of wanting to pick and choose among the provisions of
section 1305. In fact it is Matthews who is trying to pick and choose. The Receiver's
position is that the provisions of section 1305 are permissive and that the district court
was within its authority to order alternative procedures in this judicial proceeding. If,
however, section 1305 must be applied, then Matthews is not allowed to take advantage
of the more liberal definition of "claim" adopted by the district court in its procedures.
Because this Court may affirm the decision of the court of appeal for any reason that
appears on the record, the Court should affirm the court of appeals for this reason alone

5

The Order of Decree of Judicial Dissolution was entered in this case on August 21,
2002. R. 589-91. The sale of the real property that gives rise to Matthews's claim for
an additional commission did not occur until December 7, 2004, over two years later.
See Order Authorizing Sale of Silverado Property, R. 1061-67. Indeed, not only did
Matthews not have a matured noncontingent claim as of the date of dissolution, he did
not even have such a claim when he filed his notice of claim on June 30, 2004, because
even accepting Matthews's argument that there was an oral agreement to pay him a
$100,000 commission, the alleged obligation to pay that commission admittedly did not
arise unless and until the property was sold.
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and does not need to consider the legal arguments discussed in the next section of this
brief.
B.

THE DISTRICT COURT WAS ENTITLED TO CONSIDER
MATTHEWS'S CLAIM ON THE MERITS,

In an effort to avoid substantive review of his falsely filed and meritless claim,
Matthews argued to the district court that—despite the statute of frauds and the statutory
prohibition against collection of commissions by agents—his claim must be "considered
approved" pursuant to section 1305(4).6 Specifically, in an attempt to prevent the district
court from addressing his claim on the merits,7 (and after having failed to object to the
motion to establish a claims bar date and claims filing procedure which stated that a
subsequent motion to set a claims adjudication procedure would be filed), Matthews
argued that the district court lacked authority to establish any claims procedure that did
not mirror exactly section 48-2c-1305(4), a permissive provision of the LLC Act.
However, as explained below, Matthews's argument ignores (1) the permissive nature of
the procedures set forth in sections 1305 and 1306 of the LLC Act, (2) the district court's
broad authority to establish procedures for adjudicating claims of a company in
6

The statute does not define what it means when a claim is "considered approved." The
Receiver submits that an analogy to bankruptcy law is appropriate and that, at most,
"considered approved" should be construed to mean only that a rebuttal presumption
exists that the filed claim is "prima facie evidence of the validity and amount of the
claim." See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(f). In the bankruptcy context, a proof of claim is
"deemed allowed, unless a party in interest. . . objects." 11 U.S.C. § 502(a). If an
objection is filed to a claim that was otherwise "deemed allowed," then the bankruptcy
court determines the allowance of the claim. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b). Thus, even if
Matthews's claim was "considered approved," the court had the right to adjudicate the
allowance of the claim.
"7

Matthews argues to this Court that his claim "should have been paid without any further
inquiry." Matthews's Brief at 15.
30

receivership under the supervision of the court, and (3) the fact that but for the filing of a
meritless claim predicated on false information submitted under penalty of perjury, no
discussion of section 1305 of the LLC Act would even be reached. The court of appeals
determined that the permissive provisions of section 48-2c-1305 injudicial dissolutions
and the equitable powers of a receivership permit an extension of a statutory period to
"reject" claims. 2007 UT App. 361, 173 P.3d 192, f 18. The holding of the district court
was different. The district court properly held that the Successor Receiver Order did not
employ the permissive provisions of sections 1305 and 1306 of the LLC Act to adjudicate
claims, but instead ordered that claims would be adjudicated by the district court itself.
R. 2145. Regardless of which reasoning this Court chooses to follow, it should affirm the
holding of the court of appeals.
The district court's authority to appoint a receiver was based on its "inherent
equitable power." Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82,fflf50-51. Moreover, "[a] receivership
is an equitable matter and is entirely within the control of the court." Interlake Co. v. Von
Hake, 697 P.2d 238, 239 (Utah 1985). While, the Successor Receiver Order refers to the
possibility that the Receiver may use certain provisions of the LLC Act, that act is
permissive in nature and does not mandate that a court adopt any or all of its procedures.
In this case, the district court did not adopt certain permissive procedures of the LLC Act,
nor did it adopt procedures with time periods shorter than those provided for in the LLC
Act. The court's order specifically provides: "Nothing in this Order shall prevent the
Receiver from requesting augmentation, modification, or supplementation of her powers
as Receiver to the fall extent permitted by law or equity upon further application to the
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Court and after notice and hearing." R. 771 at Tf 12 (emphasis added). Even under the
LLC Act, "[t]he court appointing a receiver or custodian has exclusive jurisdiction over
the company and all of its property wherever located," Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1212(l)
and the court "shall describe the powers and duties of the receiver or custodian in its
appointing order, which may be amended from time to time," id. at § 1212(3). Further,
after a decree of dissolution is entered for a judicially dissolving company, the court is to
direct "the winding up and liquidation of the company's business and affairs in
accordance with Part 13" of the LLC Act. Id. at § 1213(2) (emphasis added). Thus, a
receivership court, exercising its exclusive jurisdiction, has broad discretion in overseeing
the receivership and dissolution of a limited liability company, and it may grant
appropriate powers to the receiver and establish appropriate procedures for the winding
up and liquidation of the company as long as they are "in accordance with" Part 13 of the
LLC Act. The district court did exactly that.
The winding up and liquidation procedures of Part 13 of the LLC Act provide that
"there is no fixed time period for completion of winding up a dissolved company" except
that it should be completed "within a reasonable time under the circumstances," id.
§ 1301, and they give a dissolving company power to "settle or compromise . .. claims
brought against... the company," id. § 1302(3), and to "settle disputes by mediation,
arbitration, or court action" id. § 1302(8) (emphasis added). Neither a receivership nor a
judicial dissolution proceeding is required by the LLC Act. Sections 1305 and 1306 of
the LLC Act provide certain procedures that a dissolving company "may" use in
disposing of claims, but by the plain language of the statute that Matthews contends
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applies, those procedures are permissive, not mandatory. See id. §§ 1305(1), 1306(1).
Consistent with and in accordance with the LLC Act, the Successor Receiver Order
provides permissively that the Receiver "may accept or reject claims as provided in Utah
Code Ann. § 48-2c-1305 and 1306" but mandatorily directs that "[t]o the extent permitted
by law, all claims filed against Olympus shall be adjudicated and determined by this
Court in and as part of this proceeding." Id. at f 4 (emphasis added; cited and discussed
in the Claim Procedures Motion). Thus, pursuant to its equitable powers, the district
court specifically granted the Receiver discretion whether to recommend to the district
court whether to use or not use the provisions of sections 1305 and 1306, with the
mandatory proviso that all claims filed against Olympus be "adjudicated and determined
by this Court." The reason that the Receiver suggested that all claims be adjudicated by
the court and the reason that the district court adopted this approach, was that the issues
in this judicial receivership were contentious and divisive. Virtually all of the claims
against the receivership estate invoked the partisanship of one member group or the other.
Thus, the district court chose to keep control over the allowance and disallowance of
every claim. The district court was legally entitled to do so. The fact that section 1305 is
permissive means that there are other ways to deal with claims, particularly in a courtsupervised receivership. As explained below, that is exactly what the district court did
here—it chose another way to deal with the claims against Olympus.
Specifically, pursuant to the Successor Receiver Order, the Receiver first sought
and obtained the Bar Date Order to establish a claims bar date and claims filing
procedures, which provisions were not inconsistent with sections 1305 and 1306.
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Specifically, the Receiver stated that she would later request procedures for the resolution
of claims that would be filed. Significantly, Matthews, who was served with the motion,
did not oppose the motion to establish the bar date or the claims filing procedure, nor did
he object to the proposed process under which the district court would later set
procedures for determining claims. Neither did Matthews request in response to that
motion that the trial court apply the provisions of section 1305 of the LLC Act to require
rejection within 90 days. The Receiver did not propose (and the district court, in
interpreting its own order, did not mandate) any of the procedures contained in sections
1305 and 1306 and specifically did not mandate any procedures contained in section
1305 and 1306 for resolving claims filed pursuant to the Bar Date Order.
Matthews argues multiple provisions of the memorandum in support of the Bar
Date Order as support for his position that the rejection provisions of section 1305 apply
to the Matthews claim. However, Matthews ignores the specific statement of the
Receiver that she would later file a motion to establish a claims adjudication process. R.
797 at f 12. Matthews also ignores the explicit language of the district court order that
"all claims filed against Olympus shall be adjudicated and determined by this Court in
and as part of this proceeding." Successor Receiver Order ^f 4. Thus, the Receiver had
no authority to "reject" or otherwise determine claims without adjudication by the court.
The Receiver relied upon that order, to which Matthews did not object. Thereafter, the
Receiver sought and obtained the Claims Resolution Order.
Matthews's argument based on section 48-2c-1305 ignores the threshold issue of
whether that statute even applies. In this case, the controlling provisions are contained in
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the district court's Bar Date Order. That order does not adopt (or even refer to) any part
of section 1305, much less state that claims must be rejected or resolved pursuant to that
statute. In fact, because the Successor Receiver Order requires all filed claims to be
"adjudicated and determined by [the district court]" and the Bar Date Order addresses
only the claim filing procedure, the Receiver had no authority to "accept or reject" claims
without obtaining further order(s) of the district court.
In addition, Matthews was properly and timely served with notice that the
Receiver intended to deal with claims against Olympus in two well-defined steps,
consistent with the district court's prior orders. First, the Receiver would obtain court
approval for a claims bar date and claims filing procedure. Second, only after she had
obtained a claims bar date and claims filing procedure, and after she had the opportunity
to review and analyze the filed claims and to try to settle or resolve claims, would the
Receiver obtain approval from the court for specific procedures, tailored to the unique
facts of this case, for adjudicating the remaining claims. Matthews was well aware of the
Receiver's two-step approach, yet he failed to assert any timely objection. Only when the
Receiver relied upon the Successor Receiver Order that claims would be adjudicated by
the district court and carried out in accordance with the second of the two steps did
Matthews object to the two-step approach and seek a windfall to have his meritless claim
"considered approved." Therefore the district court did not err in considering Matthews's
Claim on the merits.
The court of appeals alternatively determined that the trial court as a court of
equity in this receivership proceeding had authority to extend the deadlines for the
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rejection of claims. This holding is also correct and should be affirmed by this Court.
Matthews argues that section 1305 is like a statute of limitations and that the district court
did not have authority to vary from section 1305's deadlines. However, even if the
district court had ordered the application of all of the permissive provisions of section
1305 in this receivership case, the district court would still have been entitled to extend
the deadline in this case. Unlike a statute of limitations, which is only used as a shield to
bar stale claims, Matthews's interpretation of section 1305 would allow it to be used as a
sword to enforce the payment of fraudulent claims. This is far different from a statute of
limitations. In reality, what Matthews is arguing is more analogous to a default judgment
than the bar of a claim by a statute of limitations. And the law regarding default
judgments is clear. Judgments by default are not favored by the courts nor are they in the
interests of justice or fair play. Heathman v.Fabian & Clendenan, 377 P.2d 189 (Utah
1962). Indeed when any reasonable excuse is offered by the defaulting party courts
generally tend to favor granting relief from the default judgment unless to do so would
result in substantial prejudice or injustice to the adverse party. Westinghouse Elec.
Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen, 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975). In this case, the district court
did not adopt all of the permissive provisions of section 1305, and the deadlines of that
section therefore do not apply. However, if this Court disagrees and determines that the
deadlines are applicable, then the Court should affirm the decision of the court of appeals
that the district court had the power to extend those deadlines.
Matthews's motive in this case is facially transparent: he wants to have his
$100,000 claim "considered approved" and "paid without any further inquiry55 from the
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assets of the Receivership estate, without permitting any scrutiny of the merits of his
alleged orally twice-assigned oral real estate commission claim by the Receiver, the
members and creditors of Olympus, the district court (which found that the claim was
meritless and filed in bad faith), and this Court. The mere filing of that claim was
perjurious and, as the district court factually found, in bad faith. It would be improper to
use a perceived technical aspect of a permissive statutory procedure that the trial court
has held it did not adopt, to force the payment of a meritless and perjurious claim that
was filed in bad faith.
III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY AFFIRMED THE DISTRICT
COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES AND IMPOSED FEES FOR
THE APPEAL.
The court of appeals properly affirmed the districts court's decision that the

Receiver was entitled to recover attorney fees in this case, and it correctly imposed fees
for the appeal.
First, the district court correctly ruled that the Receiver was entitled to attorney
fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. That statute provides in relevant part:
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing
party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without
merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, ...
In the context of section 78-27-56, "[wjhere a party has acted on a meritless claim and in
bad faith, in most cases it would be inequitable not to award attorney fees." Wardley
Better Homes and Gardens v. Cannon, 2002 UT 99, 61 P.3d 1009, ][ 31 (emphasis
added). The district court judge in this case, the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, carefully
considered the facts and the law in rendering his opinion, and he properly ruled that the
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Receiver was entitled to recover her reasonable attorney fees incurred in defending
against Matthews's claim against Olympus because the claim was both without merit and
pursued in bad faith. The fees were also awarded pursuant to Rule 56(g) based upon
Matthews's bad faith and an intent to delay.
A.

Without Merit

A claim is "without merit" if it is "frivolous" or "of little weight or importance
having no basis in law or fact." Warner v. DMG Color, Inc., 2000 UT 102, 20 P.3d 868,
U 22. The court of appeals did not err in finding that the Matthews Claim was of "little
weight" with "no basis in law or fact."
Matthews's argument to this Court implies that the district court found that
Matthews's statutory construction of Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1305 was one of the
arguments found to be without merit. Matthews's Brief at 23. In Judge Medley's careful
fifteen pages of findings of fact and conclusions of law, however, neither section 1305
nor any argument based thereon is ever mentioned. Matthews's arguments to the district
court about section 1305 simply did not constitute any part of the district court's
determination that the Matthews Claim is without merit and that attorney fees should
therefore be awarded. Rather, the bases for the district court's "without merit"
determination were the statute of frauds and Utah's real estate commission statutes, and
the rulings of the district court and the court of appeals on these particular issues are not
before this Court because the petition for a writ of certiorari was not granted on these
issues. However, as pointed out above, Matthews's claim was barred by both the statute
of frauds and Utah's real estate broker statutes.
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Matthews argues that he had good faith arguments regarding both issues and that
he should not be penalized simply because he lost. This argument misses the point. As
to the statute of frauds, as pointed out above, Matthews knewr full well that there was no
admission from Olympus. Indeed, he admits that he tried to obtain an affidavit from
Richard Jaffa but was unsuccessful.
As to the real estate commission statute, the wording of the Utah statute is clear
and unmistakable: "No sales agent or associate broker may sue in his own name for
recovery of a fee, commission, or compensation .. .." Utah Code § Ann. 61-2-18(2).
Matthews filed the proof of claim in this case in his own name, under penalty of perjury,
for services he allegedly rendered, with no indication that he would later claim that the
alleged $100,000 commission was actually owed to his spouse or to Fred Law, the
principal broker. The very purpose of the statute is to protect a party such as the Receiver
from paying a commission to an associate broker such as Matthews only to face the
possibility that someone else, including a principal broker, could allege that the payment
should have been made to him or her. For very good reason, Utah law requires that
claims may be filed only by the principal broker.
Moreover, contrary to Matthews's assertion, Utah appellate courts have addressed
the broker commission statute at issue, Utah Code § 61-2-18, and have held that its plain
language applies literally to prohibit a person who is not a licensed principal broker—
Matthews—from suing a buyer or seller—Olympus—for a commission. In Young v.
Buchanan, 259 P.2d 876 (Utah 1953), this Court held that even though a licensed real
estate agent had an oral agreement with a licensed broker allowing the agent to work on
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his own, including the right to collect and retain all commissions derived from the agent's
efforts (similar to the alleged oral "assignment" on which Matthews relies in this case),
the agent could not sue the real estate seller directly to recover a promised commission.
Young, 259 P.2d at 876-878. The case was governed by a predecessor statute, but the
court explained that the then-recently enacted section 61-2-18 was "indicative of the
legislative spirit and intent" behind the prior statute. Id. at 878. In addressing section 612-18, the court determined that it "prohibits any person or association from bringing an
action for the recovery of any commission" for brokerage services unless the person was
duly licensed as a real estate broker at the time the services were rendered. Id. The real
estate agent even admitted in open court that "he could look only to a licensed broker for
his commission," and thus tried to join the broker as an involuntary plaintiff, but the court
rejected the attempt. Id. at 878-79. On appeal, Matthews attempts to distinguish the
Young decision on the basis that no assignment was alleged, but he ignores the rationale
of this Court.
In addition, in Morris v. John Price Assocs., Inc., 590 P.2d 315 (Utah 1979), the
Utah Supreme Court vacated a judgment in favor of a real estate agent for a commission
and held that the "trial court should have granted the motion for dismissal" as to the
agent's claim, because the language of section 61-2-18 was controlling. Morris, 590 P.2d
at 316. Conversely, the court affirmed the judgment in favor of the agent's licensed
principal broker, and held that "[wjhat the rights may be as between plaintiff [the agent]
and his then employer [the principal broker] is something for them to adjust between
themselves." Id. at 317. Thus, if there were a valid claim for a $100,000 real estate
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commission arising from Olympus's purchase of the subject property in December 1998,
only a licensed principal broker suing in its own name would have standing to sue
Olympus for the commission. Matthews's assertion that he holds an oral assignment
from his spouse who received an oral assignment from the principal broker does nothing
to override the governing statutory language. See also Diversified Gen. Corp. v. White
Barn Golf Course, Inc., 584 P.2d 848, 848, 852 (Utah 1978) (affirming summary
judgment for defendant based on section 61-2-18 because plaintiff was not a licensed
principal broker and thus could not sue for a commission for real estate services);
AndalexRes., Inc. v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1044-45 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (affirming
summary judgment for defendant based on section 61-2-18 against non-broker's claim
for a real estate commission and holding that statute is unambiguous and applies literally
to bar any claim against a buyer or seller for a commission by a person who does not
have "the requisite broker license"). In fact, allowing pursuit of a commission based on
an alleged oral assignment defeats the entire intent and purpose of the statute.
Therefore, Matthews's argument that he is entitled to pursue collection of a
commission from Olympus in his own name because a principal broker allegedly orally
assigned rights to its commissions to Matthews's spouse, who then allegedly orally
assigned the rights to Matthews, is contrary to the plain language of section 61-2-18 and
governing Utah case law holding that section 61-2-18 must be applied literally. The
court of appeals did not err in holding that the claim was without merit.
This Court has not hesitated to uphold trial courts in ruling that claims with
similarly weak or non-existent legal support were "without merit" and has permitted an
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award of legal fees under section 78-27-56. See Wardley Better Homes and Gardens v.
Cannon, 2002 UT 99, 61 P.3d 1009, t 30; Warner v. DMG Color, Inc., 2000 UT 102, 20
P.3d 868, \ 22; Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998) (holding that "a
finding that a party has attempted to avoid liability by testifying falsely will support a
decision to award attorney fees if combined with a finding of bad faith"). Advocacy is
not chilled when fees are based on false affidavits filed to adjust the facts to the legal
theory and when there is no legal basis asserted other than the argument that some sort of
admission might be elicited at trial after written acknowledgement of the alleged
commission had already been refused.
B.

In Bad Faith

In his brief to this Court, Matthews does not refute the finding of bad faith by the
trial court, and relies only on his argument that his claim had merit. Matthews's Brief at
pp. 21-32. The bad faith finding is reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, which
Mathews appears to concede.
This Court has ruled that in order to find that a party acted in "bad faith" for
purposes of section 78-27-56:
[T]he trial court must find that one or more of the following factors existed: (i) the
party lacked an honest belief in the propriety of the activities in question; (ii) the
party intended to take unconscionable advantage of others; or (iii) the party
intended to or acted with the knowledge that the activities in question would
hinder, delay, or defraud others.
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 316 (Utah 1998). Matthews's lack of an honest
belief in the legal basis for his claim, and his knowledge that his pursuit of the claim
would unjustly hinder and delay the Receiver in her attempts to administer and close the
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Olympus receivership estate, is evidenced by his contradictory representations and
admissions in the trial court. The bad faith is further evidenced by his arguments to this
Court that his false sworn statements were an inadvertent mistake without a meaningful
effect on the substantive arguments on the merits. The district court properly rejected
this argument, and the court of appeals correctly affirmed.
Moreover, Matthews knew (or was charged with knowing) that his claim was
barred by the statute of frauds and the Utah broker commission statutes. Matthews
admitted that he was a licensed associate broker at all relevant times and was bound to
follow the governing statutes and regulations. While he submitted more that 100 pages
of documents to the Receiver as support for his claim, he knew that nothing in any of
those documents specified a $100,000 commission or an assignment thereof. As a
licensed real estate professional, he was charged with knowledge that an alleged oral
promise of a commission is unenforceable as a matter of law under the statute of frauds.
"[A] broker must be presumed to know that an oral contract of employment for rendition
of services in negotiating a sale of real estate for a commission is invalid." Machan
Hampshire Props., Inc. v. Western Real Estate & Dev. Co., 779 P.2d 230, 234 (Utah
App. 1989). As a Utah-licensed real estate professional, Matthews also should be
charged with knowledge that under the plain language of governing Utah broker
commission statutes, he was strictly prohibited from pursuing a claim in his own name
against Olympus for a real estate commission.
In Warner v. DMG Color, Inc., 2000 UT 102, f 23, this Court noted that the trial
court had found "bad faith" under section 78-27-56 because the claims the plaintiff was
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asserting "had been sold by the bankruptcy trustee to Defendants in compliance with the
order of the United States Bankruptcy Court." This Court ruled that the bad faith finding
was not clearly erroneous because the fact that "plaintiff knew of the sale and participated
without objection in it, was certainly sufficient to raise the inference of bad faith on
plaintiffs part." Similarly, in Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 316 (Utah 1998), the
trial court found that the plaintiffs pursued their claims with "no other apparent reason
than to harass . .. and/or to drive up the costs of litigation," and this Court held that the
finding was enough to satisfy the "bad faith" element of section 78-27-56.
Those cases support the finding made in this case that the Matthews Claim was not
asserted or pursued in good faith, because Matthews's presumed knowledge of Utah law
respecting commission agreements and commission collections, and his materially false
and contradictory sworn statements, are "certainly sufficient to raise the inference of bad
faith," and because Matthews has pursued his claim for "no other apparent reason" than
to "drive up the costs of litigation" in trying to recover a claim he knew he was not
entitled to even assert much less pursue.
In addition to the foregoing, the district court properly ruled that the Receiver was
entitled to attorney fees on the alternate ground that Matthews submitted affidavits in bad
faith or solely for purposes of delay in violation of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(g).
Thus, even if the Receiver were not entitled to recover attorney fees pursuant to section
78-27-56, she was entitled to recover those fees incurred as a result of the false affidavits
Matthews filed on August 12, 2005, and October 20, 2005, in opposition to the
Receiver's summary judgment motion. As noted above, it is undisputed that the August
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12 affidavits contained false statements, and the October 20 affidavit contains statements
that contradict Matthews's prior statements and representations, including those made in
his Notice of Claim, his answers to discovery requests, and his Claim Response. Rule 56,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, governing summary judgment proceedings, provides in
relevant part:
If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad
faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party
presenting them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses
which the filing of the affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees.
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(g). Because the two grounds for attorney fees under this rule are
stated in the disjunctive, a showing of bad faith is not required if it is evident that the
affidavits were presented "solely for the purpose of delay." In this case, both bad faith
and an intent to delay are evident and were found present by Judge Medley in his detailed
factual findings.
Along with the summary judgment motion filed July 6, 2005, the Receiver
submitted an affidavit with a certified record from the Utah Division of Real Estate
establishing conclusively that Matthews was not a "principal broker" and therefore was
not entitled to pursue a commission claim against Olympus. In response, Matthews filed
the August 12 affidavits claiming that his wife, Jane Matthews, was the principal broker.
In reply, the Receiver submitted a further affidavit with a certified record from the Utah
Division of Real Estate establishing conclusively that Jane Matthews was not "principal
broker" at the relevant time. Then, in connection with his unauthorized last minute
"Supplemental Memorandum," Matthews filed two more affidavits on October 20
purporting to establish, for the first time (and ignoring all of his prior sworn statements to
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the contrary) that the oral promise for a $100,000 commission was actually a claim that
initially belonged to principal broker Fred B. Law, who orally assigned it to Jane
Matthews, who then orally assigned it to Matthews. This chain of events, if it does not
establish bad faith, certainly establishes that Matthews presented the affidavits solely for
the purpose of delay and to unjustly increase the costs of litigation.
Although it appears there are no reported Utah cases discussing the relevant
language of Utah Rule Civ. P. 56(g), the language of the comparable federal rule is nearly
identical. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(g). Under the federal rule, numerous courts have held
that sanctions are appropriate against a party submitting affidavits on summary judgment
that contain false statements or material omissions. E.g., In re Gioioso, 979 F.2d 956,
961-62 (3d Cir. 1992) (reversing lower court's refusal to award attorney fees and holding
that because affidavits "flatly contradicted earlier sworn depositions" and "failed to raise
material issues of fact," rule 56(g) "required" that fees be awarded); Modica v. United
States, 518 F.2d 374, 376-77 and n.2 (5th Cir. 1975) (approving sanctions imposed by the
trial court, apparently under rule 56(g), against a party who submitted an affidavit that
was an "eleventh-hour denial of facts admitted over a three-year period"); Warshay v.
Guinness PLC, 750 F. Supp. 628, 632 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (imposing rule 56(g) sanctions in
action for breach of oral agreement, in part because plaintiff omitted material facts in his
affidavit), affd, 935 F.2d 1278 (2d Cir. 1991); SMSAssocs. V. Clay, 868 F. Supp. 337,
344 (D.D.C. 1994) (awarding attorney fees under Rule 56(g) against litigant for his

Rule 56(g) does not require that a party prevail in order to receive an award of attorney
fees.
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"dilatory tactics/' "affidavits made in bad faith/' and "untrue representations under
oath"), affd, 70 F.3d 638 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank 680 F.
Supp. 144, 150 (D.NJ. 1998) (imposing rule 56(g) sanctions because plaintiff filed
affidavit contradicting her prior deposition testimony); Cobell v. Norton, 214 F.R.D. 13,
20 (D.D.C. 2003) (imposing rule 56(g) sanctions on defendants who filed "an affidavit
containing material representations of fact that defendants knew to be false" because they
"possessed a letter" showing contrary facts). In this case the facts that Matthews lied
about were essential to his case because they dealt with whether an enforceable contract
existed under the statute of frauds and whether the real estate commission statute barred
Matthews from pursuing a claim in his own name.
Based upon the foregoing, this Court should affirm the district court's decision to
award attorney fees to the Receiver in this case. In addition, pursuant to Utah Rule of
Appellate Procedure 33, the Court should award the Receiver her attorney fees on appeal
on the basis that if the arguments below were without merit, the appeal is also necessarily
without merit.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should rule that the court of appeals correctly
affirmed the rulings of the district court in this matter.
DATED this 12th day of May, 2008.
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C.

Steven T. Waterman
Brent D. Wride
Steven C. Strong
Attorneys for the Receiver
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